Keeping the Internet Flowing: How IXPs Handle DDoS

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- The need for DDoS mitigation in IXPs
- Basic concepts: The RTBH mechanism
- Approaches to DDoS mitigation in IXPs
- Recap



The need for DDoS mitigation in IXPs



- DDoS traffic comes from everywhere: transit, IXPs, etc.
- Blocking DDoS at edge works very well (if you have enough upstream bandwidth)
- In small and medium ISPs, upstream links may get congested
- Need for upstream mitigation
- Transit providers generally offer DDoS protection
- Up to now, IXPs didn't



Basic concepts: The RTBH mechanism Remotely Triggered Black Hole

- We advertise a BGP route that includes the victim's IP address
 - This can be an existing route or a new, temporary one
 - Ideally /32 although other lengths may be needed for carpet-bomb attacks
- This route is tagged with the BLACKHOLE community
 - Preferred 65535:666 as defined by RFC 7999
 - Other communities can be used instead
- The upstream network (IXP) discards all traffic destined for this prefix





How do IXPs handle DDoS? Approach 1: Blackholing

- Supported by most IXPs today, including CATNIX, DE-CIX and ESPANIX
- Customer needs to detect the attack and request the blackholing to the IXP using BGP
- All or nothing mitigation: the IXP discards all traffic destined for this prefix, including good and bad traffic



How do IXPs handle DDoS? Approach 2: Blackholing Advanced

- Introduced by DE-CIX
- Customer can drop, shape or whitelist specific protocols and ports using extended BGP communities
- Customer needs to detect the attack and request the required actions to the IXP using BGP
- Reasonably selective on what to drop, shape or whitelist
- Very hard to implement

Rule	Drop Community	Shape Community (5Mbps)
All traffic	RT:6695:4200000000	RT:6695:420000001
UDP	RT:6695:4200000002	RT:6695:420000003
UDP, source port = 0 (unassigned)	RT:6695:4200000004	RT:6695:4200000005
UDP, source port = 19 (CharGen)	RT:6695:4200000006	RT:6695:4200000007
UDP, source port = 53 (DNS)	RT:6695:420000008	RT:6695:4200000009
UDP, source port = 123 (NTP)	RT:6695:4200000010	RT:6695:4200000011
UDP, source port = 389 (LDAP)	RT:6695:4200000012	RT:6695:4200000013
UDP, source port = 11211 (Memcached)	RT:6695:4200000014	RT:6695:4200000015

How do IXPs handle DDoS? Approach 3: On demand scrubbing

- Introduced by LINX •
- Customer detects the attack and requests cleaning using • **BGP** communities
- Traffic is diverted to the scrubber, which analyzes the traffic and performs the required cleaning
- Clean traffic is routed back to customer •





Xlinx

UK UNX News Financial / Enterprise

LINX Launch Advance DDoS Solution with Nokia

Nokia has been selected by global Interne Exchange Point, the London Internet Exchange (LINX), to deliver advanced

How do IXPs handle DDoS? Approach 4: On demand scrubbing provided by 3rd party

- 3rd party takes care of scrubber/cleaning
- Customer detects the attack and requests cleaning using BGP communities
- Traffic is diverted to 3rd party for cleaning
- · Clean traffic is routed back to customer



How do IXPs handle DDoS? Approach 5: Automated scrubbing

- Customer does not need to detect the attack, it is detected automatically by the IX
- Traffic is diverted to the scrubber, which analyzes the traffic and performs the required cleaning
- Clean traffic is routed back to customer



How do IXPs handle DDoS? Approach 6: Automated edge mitigation

- Introduced by NL-ix
- Customer does not need to detect the attack, it is detected automatically by the IX
- No scrubbing appliance needed, no diversion needed
- DDoS is mitigated by the existing network devices
- Clean traffic is routed normally





Link to blog post

In September, we provely amounced our partnership with Nicks to bring subwords and NickSeries to our catterner, livesraging their cutting degle Despfield Defender for our artiflower. DOS disce their wards been strated to an experiment present to expend our series particle, will share ship where to exclude to expend our series particle in this deviction and will write to exclude the series part of the site devices in a historial evolution for an internet Exchange like $\underline{N}_{\rm COS}$.

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DDoS protection model recap Customer's perspective

	Blackholing	Blackholing Advanced	On-demand scrubbing	On-demand scrubbing (3 rd)	Automated scrubbing	Automated edge mitigation
Who detects	Customer	Customer	Customer	Customer	IXP	IXP
Mitigation	All or nothing	Complex	Full	Full	Full	Full
Automation	Partial	Partial	Partial	Partial	Full	Full
Scalability	Peering capacity	Peering capacity	2.8 Tbps	2.8 Tbps	2.8 Tbps	Peering capacity

DDoS protection model recap IXP's perspective

	Blackholing	Blackholing Advanced	On-demand scrubbing	On-demand scrubbing (3 rd)	Automated scrubbing	Automated edge mitigation
Network requirements	Basic equipment	Powerful filtering	Basic equipment	Basic equipment	Basic equipment	Powerful filtering
Integration requirements	Easy	Medium	Easy	Easy	Easy	Easy
Customer perception	Poor	Medium	Good	Good	Good	Good
Cost	Low	Low	Medium	Low (3 rd party)	Medium	Medium
Revenue	None	None	Good	Medium	Good	Good

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